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ABSTRACT
The expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to numerous innovations in the industry, 
including improvements to existing systems. Disaster prevention and monitoring systems are a prime 
example of such systems. Every year, there are significant and preventable financial losses, not to 
mention the safety hazards caused by floods. To warn people ahead of time, it is possible to deploy 
low-power wireless sensor nodes to send readings across any terrain to a cloud platform, which can 
perform pattern analysis, prediction, and alert forwarding to anyone's cellular device. In this paper, I 
propose Flomosys, a low-cost, low-power, secure, scalable, reliable, and extensible IoT system for 
monitoring creek and river water levels. Although there are multiple competing solutions to help 
mitigate this problem, Flomosys fills a niche not covered by existing solutions. Flomosys can be built 
inexpensively with off-the-shelf components and scales across vast territories at a low cost per sensor 
node. This paper presents the design and implementation of Flomosys as well as real-world test 
results.
iii
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Flomosys: A Flood Monitoring System
Tai Groot





The expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to numerous innovations in the
industry, including improvements to existing systems. Disaster prevention and moni-
toring systems are a prime example of such systems. Every year, there are significant
and preventable financial losses, not to mention the safety hazards caused by floods.
To warn people ahead of time, it is possible to deploy low-power wireless sensor nodes
to send readings across any terrain to a cloud platform, which can perform pattern
analysis, prediction, and alert forwarding to anyone’s cellular device. In this paper, the
author proposes Flomosys, a low-cost, low-power, secure, scalable, reliable, and extensi-
ble IoT system for monitoring creek and river water levels. Although there are multiple
competing solutions to help mitigate this problem, Flomosys fills a niche not covered by
existing solutions. Flomosys can be built inexpensively with o!-the-shelf components
and scales across vast territories at a low cost per sensor node. This paper presents the
design and implementation of Flomosys as well as real-world test results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Floods are notoriously earth’s most frequent and most destructive natural hazard. While
flood damage counts in the billions worldwide as is, climate scientists have predicted
that with the rise of global warming, flood events will only intensify in number and
magnitude over time. Between the years of 1995 and 2015, flooding a!ected 2.3 billion
people, and claimed 157,000 lives across the globe [1]. Since 2000, the US has spent over
$107 billion on the damages caused by floods. During the past seventeen years, however,
annual damage costs have continued to increase. California’s San Francisco Bay Area
in particular is facing a grim future. In 2017, San Jose su!ered a flooding of the Coyote
Creek which amounted to around $100 million in total damage and displaced 14,000
residents [2]. The Bay Area is not alone in its dismal future according to a team of
scientists and economists which studied the global impacts of a rising sea level coupled
with a growing economy and population. Their reports predict that flood damage
worldwide will cost up to $1 trillion per year by 2050.
In this paper, we present the design and development of a low-power, reliable, low-
cost, scalable, secure, and extensible flood monitoring system, referred to as Flomosys.
This system was installed and has been running in California’s Bay Area since Summer
2019. Figure 1.1 presents a high-level architectural diagram of Flomosys. The system
is composed of three distinct components, Sensor Nodes (referred to as Nodes), the
Gateway, and the Cloud platform. A full installation requires at least one instance of
each, but can be scaled e"ciently to support many Nodes for each Gateway and multiple
Gateways per Cloud. Since Nodes typically rely on battery or energy harvesting as their
energy source, we design a low-power circuit and also employ software techniques to
minimize energy consumption. Nodes communicate with the Gateway using the long-
range radio (LoRa) wireless protocol [3]. On top of LoRa, we design and implement
a novel encryption and authentication mechanism called HMENC, which is suitable
for low-bandwidth, low-power devices. This specialized encryption mechanism requires
very little overhead and provides a built-in checksum feature making it more e"cient
1
















Fig. 1.1: Flomosys architecture. Each Node measures water level and transmits its data over a long-
range, secure link to the Gateway. Each Gateway operates on multiple frequencies, perform duplicate
packet detection, and forwards the received data to the Cloud. The Cloud provides an administration
dashboard for system configuration, as well as data analysis.
than AES or similar general-purpose ciphers, allowing Flomosys to operate using very
little energy. In fact, according to our power profiling results, Flomosys should be able
to survive between 100 days and almost three years on a 2400 mAh battery, depending
on wireless transmission variables (as we will explain in Section 5).
The Gateway design includes an array of receivers connected to directional antennas
operating on di!erent frequencies. This provides the Nodes with the diversity required
to reach the Gateway in case of link unreliability. Also, the Gateway can be fully
implemented using low-cost, single-board Linux devices such as the Raspberry Pi (RPi).
If solar or limited energy resources are powering the Gateway, duty-cycling mechanisms
are used to reduce its energy consumption [4]. In our current deployment, the Gateway
has been installed on the roof of an 11-level tall building belonging to Santa Clara
University (SCU).
In addition to reporting water level values to interested agencies, Flomosys can pro-
vide endangered residents with proper flood notice. We hope that the designs for this
functional system will be freely available for further implementation to aid other flood-
prone regions worldwide that su!er frequent losses due to flood damage but have yet
to implement robust flood monitoring technology due to financial constraints. For this
reason, the Flomosys platform is open-source and is designed to be assembled using
commercial o!-the-shelf (COTS) components. The source code and hardware designs
are published publicly and are freely available, hosted by GitHub on the SIOTLAB’s
2
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GitHub account1. With this low-cost design, strategic flood precaution is no longer
out of reach for impoverished areas and third-world countries. Ultimately, the cost of
implementation no longer outweighs the impending costs of flood-related damages.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we present the system
requirements. In Chapter 3, we detail the system architecture and how the di!erent
components move data from a Node to the web application. In Chapter 4, we discuss
the wireless communication protocols used and the HMENC encryption protocol. In
Chapter 5 we examine the power profiling results and explain theoretical system lifetime.
In Chapter 6 we discuss related work and how Flomosys fills a new place in the landscape
of flood monitoring. We conclude the paper in Chapter 7.
1https://github.com/SIOTLAB/Flomosys
3
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Chapter 2
Requirements
The major requirements of the system are reliability, energy e!ciency, scalability, and
security.
Concerning reliability, in the case of system failures, flood warnings may not reach en-
dangered communities, which is arguably worse than having no system in place at all, as
residents may rely on the system. Reliability must be addressed from multiple perspec-
tives. First, the sampled data regarding water height must be accurate. Second, the
software managing the operation of Nodes, Gateway, and Cloud platform must always
be operational. Third, the Nodes must be able to transmit their data to the Gateway
reliably. Fourth, the lifetime of the system components—especially the battery—must
be long and predictable.
From the energy-e!ciency point of view, Nodes may rely on battery or solar harvested
energy to recharge their battery. Therefore, it is essential to minimize energy consump-
tion to reduce the cost of an energy harvesting system [5] Relying on renewable energy
o!ers the additional benefit of reducing maintenance costs by eliminating the need to
replace batteries frequently.
From the scalability point of view, the system must be easy to extend without having
to deploy a large number of Gateways. Specifically, since deploying Gateways is more
costly and requires permanent Internet access, the ratio of the number of Nodes to the
number of Gateways must be a large number.
Last but not least, secure communication between Nodes and Gateways is essential.
In this regard, authenticity is necessary to ensure a valid Node has generated the data
received by a Gateway. Also, integrity is required to ensure the received data is tamper-
free. Confidentiality is not essential because the data sampled by Nodes are not confi-
dential.
4
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Chapter 3
Architecture and System Overview
At a high level, the system architecture is composed of three components, as Figure 1.1
shows: one or multiple Nodes, one or multiple Gateways, and a cloud-based coordination
and management system, which is simply referred to as the Cloud.
3.1 Nodes
Figure 3.1 shows a Node’s circuitry and packaging. The two major responsibilities of a
Node are collecting measurements and sending data packets to the Gateway.
Each Node’s sampling rate is adjusted based on several factors, including the last-
measured water level and custom settings configured via the Cloud. In the current
deployment, during normal operation (i.e., no hazard detected) the sampling interval
is within the range of 15 to 30 minutes, depending on a per-node configuration set in
the firmware. As the water level increases, the Node’s software reduces the sampling
interval to ensure timely detection and response. These parameters are configurable via
the Cloud platform.
The Node’s circuitry includes a microcontroller, wireless transceiver, power distribution
circuit, and interface to communicate with an ultrasonic sensor. To reduce the power
consumption of the Nodes, several software and hardware optimizations were made.
These optimizations allows the Node to achieve a 30 µA current consumption during
sleep mode. The microcontroller used is the ATMEGA328P, which is available on Ar-
duino Pro Mini boards [6]. The software improvements include enabling a low-power
mode named "power-down" and disabling all unnecessary functionalities. Specifically,
power-down is a power-saving configuration supported by the ATMEGA328P. Power-
down mode disables everything except the watchdog timer, TWI Address Match, and
interrupts, including pin interrupts. The watchdog timer allows the Node to automat-
ically wake from power-down mode without requiring an external clock or interrupt
5
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.1: (a) Node’s circuitry, and (b) packaging used for installation. Low-power circuit design and
software improvements were employed to ensure minimum power consumption. The current draw of
the circuitry during sleep mode is 30 µA.
trigger. The watchdog periodically generates an interrupt, which transitions the mi-
crocontroller from power-down mode to normal operation. If the watchdog wakes the
MCU too early, it will revert back to power-down mode until the next timer interrupt,
or if it is time to wake, the MCU may remain in normal mode to sample the sensor and
transmit data.
Energy e"ciency of the circuitry is improved as follows. First, the regulator of the
Arduino Pro Mini has been removed. Instead, we use the MCP1703 regulator [7], which
has a low-quiescent current of 2 µA. MCP1703 also allows input voltage within the
range 2.7 to 16 V; thereby simplifying interfacing various energy sources such as solar
energy harvesting systems. During sleep mode, the microcontroller cuts the power to
the wireless transceiver and the ultrasonic sensor to avoid any current leakage. This is
achieved by using two on-board transistors. The debugging LEDs (A0-A2) can also be
fully disabled by jumpers. We have also removed the onboard LED of the Arduino Pro
Mini.
6
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3.1.1 Sensor
In addition to energy e"ciency, the sensor must provide accurate water level measure-
ments by reporting the distance from the Node itself to the surface of the water. The
three main types of distance sensors are ultrasound, LiDAR, and radar. Many LiDAR
technologies have issues properly reflecting o! water and penetrate the surface instead,
leaving radar and ultrasound, both with similar features. Also, ultrasound modules
are cheaper than their radar counterparts. Therefore, because ultrasound is a!ord-
able, reflects o! water properly, and is easy to source from a manufacturing standpoint
compared to other technologies, it makes for the ideal distance sensor for Flomosys.
Passive ultrasound sensors send a set of very short pulses and detect the reflection of
these signals. A transducer emits these sound pulses, which reflect o! objects back to
the sensor, and the transducer detects the echoes. The device can then measure the
time it takes between the sending and receiving of these pulses. Using this time we can
determine the distance between the sensor and the object that has been detected.
3.1.2 Control Program
Algorithm 1 presents pseudocode of the program controlling the Node’s operation.
When a node is awake during its duty-cycle, it first samples using the ultrasonic sensor.
Next, it uses HMENC to encrypt the packet, and enters the transmission loop. In the
transmission loop, an encrypted packet is transmitted on channel 914 and the node
waits for an acknowledgement packet from the base station. If no packet is received
before a timeout, the node transmits again on channel 915, and possibly again on 916.
This channel hopping helps ensure the node does not violate FCC regulations. Once
a packet is received, it is validated. If the packet is too long or short, it is discarded
immediately, the retry counter is incremented, and the system attempts to transmit and
receive again, provided it has not already retried too many times. If the packet is the
right size, it is decrypted and the checksum is calculated. Invalid checksums result in
another transmission attempt, retries permitting. Valid checksums result in one of two
situations: either the packet is a valid acknowledgement, or it is a seed upgrade. If the
packet is an ack, the loop is finished and the node goes into a power-down sleep mode
until the duty cycle is finished. Seed upgrades tell the node to update their sequence
number and attempt to transmit again, regardless of retries. As this case is very rare,
7
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and the FCC regulations require an "average" dwell time to be lower than 400 ms, an
immediate retry every few hundred packets in the event of node reboot is not an issue.
3.2 Gateway
A Gateway is responsible for collecting sensor data readings from Nodes, acknowledging
the reception of measurements, filtering duplicate receptions, and forwarding data to
the Cloud. A Gateway implementation includes multiple Linux-based boards, such as
the Raspberry Pi (RPi), where each is connected to a wireless transceiver and antenna.
To interface each RPi with a wireless transceiver, we have designed daughter boards
that are compatible with RPi header pins. The Gateway was installed on top of a 11-
level building belonging to Santa Clara University. The roof of the building was already
rented out to several telecommunication providers and therefore has a steady power
supply and very fast, reliable internet access.
3.3 Cloud
The Cloud Application runs on a managed server hosted on Linode, a hosting service
which has a 99.9% uptime SLA, preexisted AWS, and is less expensive than EC2. The
Cloud’s application itself consists of a front-end and back-end. The API back-end,
implemented in Golang, accepts authenticated incoming connections from Gateways
streaming measurements and serves requests for the data to the front-end. The front-
end, an application written in VueJS, displays several graphs to the user, displaying
readings for the previous week, month, and all-time data. An administrator console
allows vendors such as water districts to register web-hooks for events such as water
level passing a certain threshold. All connections to and from the server are served over
TLS with a certificate auto-renewed by LetsEncrypt, a free SSL Certificate Authority
(CA). The domain registration is handled through Google Domains, which costs $12
USD per year. Therefore, the total cost to run the cloud services for a year comes to
less than $75 USD without requiring expertise with serverless functions.
8
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Algorithm 1: Operation of a Node’s Controlling Program
1 while true do
2 retries = 0;
3 read_ultrasonic();














18 if msg_type == seed upgrade then
19 if seed packet has correct seq_no then
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Chapter 4
Wireless Communication
In this section, we discuss the importance and challenges of wireless communication
while designing Flomosys. We also present the details of wireless communication and
the security protocol implemented.
4.1 Reliable, Long-Range Wireless Links
The choice of wireless technology used has a significant impact in terms of reliability,
energy-e"ciency, range, and security. We did not choose cellular communication for
several reasons. First, cellular service may not be available in remote areas, and it is
unreasonable to expect Flomosys end-users to set up their own cell towers in the event
of no coverage. Second, cellular communication requires subscription, which increases
deployment cost. Although WiFi o!ers a high data rate and standardized security
practices, its range is short and requires access point installation near (!100 m) each
Node. Also, the WiFi communication protocol requires association and maintaining
association to allow the Nodes to communication with access points. Both 802.15.4 and
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) o!er energy-e"cient communication. However, similar to
WiFi, the communication range of both of these technologies is short (!100 m).
Given the above discussion, the application at hand requires a low-power wide-area net-
work (LPWAN) technology stack. The three main LPWAN technologies in the market
are SigFox, Ingenu, and LoRa. We chose LoRa because it satisfies our system require-
ments in terms of message rate, range, and energy e"ciency [8, 9]. LoRa, developed
by SemTech, operates in the 915 MHz (North America), 829 MHz (Europe), and 433
MHz (Asia) bands. It has no duty cycle restrictions in North America thanks to its
spread-spectrum modulation scheme [10], but a maximum dwell time of 400 ms per
channel per 20 second interval is enforced. It can achieve a data rate up to 300 Kbps,
but typical data rates are between 300 bps and 27 Kbps, depending on the spreading
10
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factor used. LoRa is unique, with a proprietary hardware stack built to run open source
software. The LoRa module that we use is Semtech 1276 [11], which can operate in the
137 MHz to 1020 MHz frequency band. After performing several power profiling tests,
such as the one represented in Figure 4.1, it was determined the total energy required
to transmit a LoRa packet at +20 dBm with this module ranged from 0.702 Joules to
0.960 Joules, depending on the coding rate and spreading factor.
The same transceiver (Semtech 1276) is used by Nodes as well as the Gateway. The
radio control software utilizes Radiohead, an open source RF library licensed under
GPLv2 [12]. Each Node is equipped with a directional antenna (mounted on a tall
pole near its bridge) pointing toward the Gateway. The current Gateway deployment
includes 6 RPi boards. These RPi boards operate on 3 di!erent frequencies with two
boards operating on each frequency. This configuration provides redundancy in case
of failures. The three frequencies used are 914, 915, and 916 MHz. The transceivers
use a spreading factor of 1024 chip-per-second (CPS), a 4/7 coding rate, and have a
transmission power of +20 dBm. Each RPi couple is connected to a directional antenna,
mounted on a mast installed on the roof of Swig Hall, the tallest building on the campus
of Santa Clara University (SCU), at over 11 stories. Figure 4.2 show antennas connected
to the Gateway. Together these four antennas span the entire area we need to cover to
measure the bridges along Coyote Creek and Guadalupe Creek. We observed reliable
coverage extending just over 9 miles away from the Gateway.
4.2 Data Security and Integrity
Because the LoRa protocol does not provide any inbuilt encryption or method for secure
channel transmission, we have implemented a low-cost data authentication and integrity
scheme.
LoRa facilitates the transmission of small packets over a long distance, and the reliability
of packet transmission degrades as packet size increases. The data that we need to
send is water level, which is represented by a 4-byte variable. Important metadata
includes a client ID number to determine which Node is transmitting the reading, and a
sequence number, so that duplicate readings can be detected by the Gateway. Duplicate
transmissions occur when a Node sends a packet, the Gateway receives it and sends
back an ACK, but the ACK is lost; therefore, the Node retransmits the packet. This is
demonstrated in Figure 4.4.
11
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Fig. 4.1: The power required to transmit LoRa packets over time.
Fig. 4.2: Four directional antennas connected to the Gateway. The Gateway has been installed on top
of a 11-level building in Santa Clara.
We also added a 2-byte checksum for data validation. After including all the metadata,
the message size is 16 bytes.
Such a small packet size is not e!ectively encrypted with modern encryption algorithms,
as they require extra bytes for padding. Typically, using AES-128 would require us to
transmit a ciphertext that is a multiple of 16 bytes, which means we are unnecessarily
increasing packet size and reducing the chance of a successful transmission.
Additionally, there is a hard limit to the legal transmission length. In the USA, the FCC
mandated the maximum dwell time per channel must not exceed 400 ms over any 20
12
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Fig. 4.3: The Gateway and Nodes use directional antennas to improve connectivity. This figure shows
two sample locations where the Nodes were placed and their connectivity with the Gateway were tested.
second period. However, to establish stable long-distance links, a high spreading factor
and coding rate must be used. These variables significantly increase the time spent
transmitting per byte of payload data. Sending 25 bytes or more with a coding rate of
13








Fig. 4.4: This diagram illustrates three possible cases for message transmission. The first transmission
is rejected by the gateway for using an invalid rand_seqno, or seed. The gateway responds with a seed
upgrade. The second transmission is received by the gateway, but the ACK message is lost, therefore
the Node retransmits the message. Finally, the third transmission is successful and the node receives
the ACK sent by the gateway.
4/7 and a spreading factor of 10 results in an illegal transmission rate. Importantly, if
the explicit header and CRC are used, there are only 19 usable bytes for the payload
section (see Figure 4.5a) of the packet. Similarly, Europe has duty-cycle limitations per
channel. As a result, the longer the message sent is, the more infrequent messages must
be sent to prevent breaking regulations.
As extra bytes in the total packet size should be avoided to improve transmission reli-
ability, we implemented our own encryption and authentication solution for small data
payloads, backed by SHA-2.
4.3 HMENC: Low-Power Encryption
HMENC, the encryption solution implemented in Flomosys, uses HMAC and is inspired
by the HOTP/TOTP authentication schemes widely in use today for 2-Factor Authen-
tication. The distinction between authentication and confidentiality is important, as
generally HTOP/TOTP are only defined for authentication and do not meet the crite-
ria for safe encryption. Additionally, HMENC has not been certified, and although it
o!ers su"cient data confidentiality for Flomosys’ use case, the HMENC is better suited
to ensure integrity and authenticity. It is important to emphasize that the data pay-
14
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44 Bits 12 Bits 8 Bits 8 Bits 8 Bits
rand_seqno client_id msg_type seq_no retries
32 Bits 16 Bits
data checksum
(a) The packet generated by HMENC for float data types. Unencrypted data is filled in gray,
and encrypted data is in white. The values in each field represents the number of bits used.






(b) The physical layer frame used in Flomosys consists of a 2-part preamble, explicit physical
headers, the actual data payload, and finally a 2 byte CRC.
Fig. 4.5: (a) Message format. (b) Physical layer frame format.
Algorithm 2: Encryption and Integrity Algorithm
1 Function encrypt_packet(char message[7], char packet[16]):
2 char checksum[2], pad [9], bu!er [9];
3 checksum " calc_checksum(checksum);
4 pad " gen_HMAC(rand_seqno);
5 bu!er " message + checksum
6 ciphertext " bu!er # pad ;
7 packet " rand_seqno + ciphertext ;
load in this case is extremely small, and only due to this small size does our particular
implementation work. As such, HMENC is only defined for small data payloads, such
as those under 64 Bytes. Figure 4.5 presents the HMENC message format.
The encryption algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. Both the Gateway and the Node
are preloaded with a shared 32-byte encryption key. Additionally, the gateway maintains
a registry of client IDs, which are unique and baked into the Node firmware before
deployment. The first time the Nodes are activated, the random number generator is
seeded using a static input read from an unused analog pin. Note that it is not critical
that this pseudo-random generator be cryptographically random. The random generator
fills the first five and a half bytes in a seven-byte array with a pseudo-random sequence
number, and the client ID is inserted into the last byte and a half. This seven-byte
sequence is used as m, the message variable defined by HMAC, and the pre-shared key
is used as the HMAC key.
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H(K) K is larger than block size
K otherwise
Given K, m, and H, HMAC is defined as follows:
HMAC(K,m) = H((K ! # opad)$H((K ! # ipad)$m)) (4.1)
where H is a cryptographic hash function (such as SHA-256), K is the key, opad and
ipad are magic numbers multiplied by the block size as defined in the HMAC spec, and
m is a message, in this case our random_seqno [13].
The HMAC algorithm is run and the output is truncated to 9 bytes. This truncated
hash is the pad. The message payload is four bytes, long enough to contain a float.
The metadata included along with the payload includes a byte for the message type (to
allow for future extensibility), one byte for a sequence number, and one byte to hold the
number of retries. The two bytes at the end of the plaintext store a two-dimensional
checksum value calculated from the rest of the plaintext to verify message authenticity
after it is decrypted.
After the metadata, data, and checksum are loaded into a bu!er, the plaintext is XORed
with the pad, and the rand_seqno is prepended to the packet. Lastly, the packet is
handed o! to the RadioHead LoRa functions for transmission.
Upon receiving a message, the gateway first unpacks the client ID from the 6th and
7th bytes to verify the packet sender is a valid client. Next, the first 7 bytes of the
packet are loaded into another bu!er and run through the HMAC function along with
the pre-shared token to reproduce the pad. The remaining 9 bytes of the packet (the
ciphertext) are XORed with the pad to reveal the plaintext. Then, the first 7 bytes
of the plaintext are passed through the checksum function, and if the 2-byte checksum
matches the checksum provided by the remaining 2 bytes of the plaintext, the packet
is determined to be valid. The sequence number is compared to the last seen sequence
number. If it is a repeated number, then the gateway will ignore the data but still sends
an ACK.
In order to prevent replay attacks, the gateway keeps a list of the last-used rand_bytes
sequences per node. As rand_bytes sequences increase by a constant every message
sent, only the last seen sequence per device needs to be remembered.
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If a gateway sends a new message with an old random seed (distinguishable from a
retransmission thanks to the sequence number), the gateway will respond with a seed
upgrade packet. This packet uses the 6 bytes otherwise occupied by the float, sequence
number and retries counter to store the first 6 bytes of the rand_bytes the device should
use next. The seventh byte is already known, as it is derived from the client ID. This
leaves the second half of the 6th byte unused, as it is also occupied by the client id. It
is instead set to the value of the invoking packet’s sequence number divided by 2, to
help mitigate seed upgrade replay attacks. When a device receives this seed upgrade
message, it compares the sequence number sent to the sequence number included in the
packet. If it is determined to be valid, the Node updates the seed stored in memory
to match what the gateway sent, and repacks the original message with the new seed.
Therefore, one retransmission is necessary before the data is accepted and processed by
the gateway.
The HMENC algorithm is very fast and requires very little energy overhead. Our system
profiling shows that the HMENC encryption operation requires approximately 3.28 ms
of compute time on a Node. To run these tests, the HMENC code-base was profiled,
then modified such that calling the entry-point function immediately returns without
any other operations, and profiled again. In Figure 4.6, results from these tests show
the cyclical power consumption curve is smoother and shifted higher on the Y-axis,
signifying higher energy consumption. Specifically, the baseline tests required 0.071 mJ
per operation, and each HMENC encryption required 0.299 mJ per operation. These
results were collected using the EMPIOT board [14].
In the end, HMENC requires at least 16 bytes of ciphertext just as AES-128 would,
but it o!ers several benefits over AES. HMENC o!ers an in-built checksum solution to
prevent data corruption, and it allows us to reuse one key across all the devices as no
two devices will ever use the same rand_seqno or client id. HMENC allows us to reject
packets received by one node but intended for another without decrypting them first,
providing speed and therefore power savings. Additionally, if we choose to add features
to the device in the future and we must increase our packet size by one byte, we can
send a 17-byte packet, whereas using AES-128 would require us to use at least 32 bytes,
possibly more depending on how the initialization vector (IV) is generated.
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Fig. 4.6: The power consumption of HMENC on Flomosys was compared to a modified HMENC library
which returns a constant immediately upon being called to baseline the required power.
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Chapter 5
Lifetime Analysis
As mentioned in Section 2, energy e"ciency is a major concern for Flomosys. Addition-
ally, energy e"ciency is directly related to the reliability concerns for the system. As
Flomosys is designed for remote locations, often without electricity, it should be feasible
to power the system with renewable energy. For example, it should not drain a battery
faster than an inexpensive, COTS solar panel is capable of recharging. However, given
the many variables involved in calculating expected energy harvest bounties from re-
newable sources, we have instead chosen to determine how long the system can survive
powered by a 2400 mAh battery.
The energy costs for each operation, including data sample collection, packet encryption,
and wireless transmission have been recorded and analyzed using the EMPIOT board
[14]. These measurements, as well as sleep power consumption were also measured and
verified using a high-precision DMM (Tektronix 7510). To determine the theoretical
lifetime of Flomosys with di!erent average retries and wireless configurations, we have
used the following equation:
lifetime =
Ebat
(Eu + (Ee + Et)% (R + 1) + Es)%N
=
3600% 2400% 10"3 % 5
(Eu + (Ee + Et)%R + Es)%N
(5.1)
where Eu, Ee, Et, and Es are the energy consumption for sampling with the ultrasonic
sensor, encrypting a packet, transmitting a packet, and sleeping. Ebat is the available
energy of the battery, N is the number of cycles per hour, and R is the average number
of retries per cycle.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the most reliable transmission results were observed with
a coding rate of 4/7 and a spreading factor of 1024. However, if the Node is closer to
the base station, a lower spreading factor and coding rate may be acceptable. For this
reason, two graphs have been generated: Figure 5.1a, which displays the theoretical
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(a) CR: 4/7; SF: 1024 CPS (b) CR: 4/5; SF: 128 CPS
Fig. 5.1: Theoretical lifetime assuming a 2400 mAh battery with no self-discharge for di!erent average
retransmissions, spreading factors (SF), and coding rates (CR).
system lifetime for various retransmission rates at the actual coding rate and spreading
factor used, and Figure 5.1b which displays the theoretical system lifetime for various
retransmission rates at a lower spreading factor and coding rate, to show maximum
lifetime.
Finally, it is important to note these figures do not take into account battery self-
discharge, which will significantly lower the system lifetime. The particular battery we
use has a lifespan of 5 years [15]. Consequently, the system remains operational for a
substantial period before any key component replacement is necessary. Ultimately, the
longevity of this component reduces the need for frequent maintenance.
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Chapter 6
Related Work
The Philippines, which is among the most flood-prone regions in the world, has launched
a program that predominantly utilizes LiDAR 3D terrain mapping as well as ultrasonic
sensors. The LiDAR technology is coupled with computer-assisted analyses to pinpoint
landslide-prone areas, while the ultrasonic sensors are utilized to monitor water levels.
More recently, there has been an increased focus on deploying flood warning systems
on urban streets. All of these sensors provide data that is analyzed and interpreted,
then shared with the public via online flood information websites and mobile device
applications.
Another project in the Philippines developed a real-time flood monitoring and early
warning system to monitor the water level of the Cagayan River through ultrasonic
sensors [16]. This sensor system consists of an Arduino, ultrasonic sensors, a GSM
module, web-monitoring software, and SMS-notification hooks to alert stakeholders and
mitigate casualties related to flooding.
In 2008, various states in the United States experienced devastating floods [17], including
Iowa [18]. This led the University of Iowa to create an Iowa Flood Center (IFC), which
was also supported by Tech State of Iowa. IFC has developed many inexpensive river
stage (height of water levels above a locally defined reference elevation) sensors which are
mounted on bridges to span rivers and streams. They have developed a self-contained
and compact Bridge-Mounted River Stage Sensor (BMRSS) [19] for monitoring small
rivers and streams, consisting of an ultrasonic distance sensors, a solar panel, a GPS
antenna, a heartbeat LED indicator, a cellular modem antenna, and a serial port. In
operation, a BMRSS wakes periodically, measures its distance from the water surface
and transmits this information via the Internet to IFC servers. They have also developed
the Iowa Flood Information System (IFIS) which ingests real time data from BMRSS
units and provides a real-time flood monitoring. BMRSS units consist of ultrasonic
distance sensor from the Senix Company designed for operation up to 15.2 m (50 ft)
with RS-485 interfaces. BMRSS enhances the output from flood forecasting models and
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can operate for several years unattended even in harsh environments. As the techniques
driven by ultrasonic sensors matured, they have been widely adopted in the various
fields of engineering, especially in flood monitoring systems.
Another smart flood monitoring system presented in [20] used the Blynk platform as a
medium of data transmission. This system proposes using two NodeMCU development
boards connected through Blynk. Blynk is a platform with iOS and Android applications
to control an Arduino or Raspberry Pi remotely via the internet [21], providing a digital
dashboard to build a graphical user interface with custom widgets. In this project, one
NodeMCU is placed at the flood area while the second one acts as the control unit.
The transmitter unit consists of a NodeMCU, an ultrasonic sensor, and an LCD display
to show the current reading. The data from the ultrasonic sensor is sent to the Blynk
application over WiFi, where it is stored in a database and can be transmitted to the
internet if the second NodeMCU is connected. This system, using WiFi, has short
range especially in urban areas, and deploying nodes on many bridges requires much
more hardware than Flomosys, as there is a 1:1 ratio of base stations to nodes, compared
to our one-to-many approach.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Multiple competing solutions o!er comparable features and use similar methods to
monitor flood zones. Unlike the other solutions, Flomosys can be built inexpensively
with o!-the-shelf components and scales across vast territories at a low cost per Node.
In the worst case, Flomosys can continuously report data over long distances over 100
days using a 2400 mAh battery, or for 2.8 years under perfect conditions, marking it
as very low-power and energy e"cient. HMENC, the low-power encryption algorithm
secures all data sent between Nodes and Gateways, and the protocol supports adding
new message types in case additional modules need to be added to the board. Together,
these properties ensure Flomosys is a low-cost, low-power, secure, scalable, reliable, and
extensible flood monitoring solution.
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